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This paper targets two main goals. First, we want to provide an overview of available datasets that can be
used by researchers and where to ﬁnd them. Second, we want to stress the importance of sharing datasets
to allow researchers to replicate results and improve the state of the art. To answer the ﬁrst goal, we
analyzed 715 peer-reviewed research articles from 2010 to 2015 with focus and relevance to digital fo-
rensics to see what datasets are available and focused on three major aspects: (1) the origin of the dataset
(e.g., real world vs. synthetic), (2) if datasets were released by researchers and (3) the types of datasets
that exist. Additionally, we broadened our results to include the outcome of online search results. We also
discuss what we think is missing. Overall, our results show that the majority of datasets are experiment
generated (56.4%) followed by real world data (36.7%). On the other hand, 54.4% of the articles use existing
datasets while the rest created their own. In the latter case, only 3.8% actually released their datasets.
Finally, we conclude that there are many datasets for use out there but ﬁnding them can be challenging.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Introduction
Research may or may not require datasets. For instance, if one
wants to construct an e-mail parser, perform Android malware
analysis or improve facial recognition algorithms, one would need
access to e-mails, malware samples or facial images, respectively.
On the other hand, creating an encryption scheme, post-quantum
key exchange or side-channel attacks may not necessarily require
a particular dataset. This article focuses on the former type of
research. In order to produce high-quality research results, we
argue that three critical features must be examined:
1. Quality of the datasets. This helps guarantee that results are
accurate and generalizable. Researchers need data that is
correctly labeled and similar to the real world or originates from
the real world.
2. Quantity of the datasets. This ensures that there is sufﬁcient data
to train and validate approaches/tools which is especially
important when utilizing machine learning techniques.
3. Availability of data. This is critical as it allows the research to
commence and ensures reproducible results helping in
improving the state of the art.
For instance, a comparison/improvement of results is only
possible if the identical input data sources are used. Therefore,
researchers either need access to the tool/algorithm or the data
source. As test-runs can be time consuming and require familiarity
with someone else's approach, one usually favors access to data-
sets. We therefore contend that is important to have easily acces-
sible datasets. This was also pointed out by Penrose et al. (2013)
who stated “in the scientiﬁc method it is important that results
be reproducible. An independent researcher should be able to
repeat the experiment and achieve the same results. […] Most
research has been done with private or irreproducible corpora
generated by random searches on the WWW.”
The importance of available datasets is now also addressed by
granting agencies, government and other three letter agencies.
Precisely, “The Obama Administration is committed to the prop-
osition that citizens deserve easy access to the results of research
their tax dollars have paid for” (Stebbins, 2013). Consequently,
some federal granting agencies now require a data management
plan, e.g., NIST (2014). On the other hand, agencies sponsored
online repositories such as the Computer Forensic Reference Data
Sets (CFReDS, cfreds.nist.gov.1) from NIST or the Information
Marketplace for Policy and Analysis of Cyber-risk& Trust (IMPACT,
impactcybertrust.org) program from the Department of Home-
land Security that “supports global cyber risk research & devel-
opment by coordinating, enhancing and developing real world
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data, analytics and information sharing capabilities, tools, models,
and methodologies.”
In this work we analyzed a total of 715 cybersecurity and cyber
forensics research articles from the years 2010e2015 from ﬁve
different conferences/journals with respect to the utilization of
datasets. We ﬁrst categorized the dataset's origin (i.e., computer
generated, experiment generated or real world), then analyzed its
availability (i.e., if a dataset was released). Lastly, we examined the
different kinds of datasets (e.g., malware, disk images, etc.).
Our ﬁndings illustrate that the majority of available datasets
were experiment generated (over 1/2) and only around 1/3 origi-
nated from real world data. Furthermore, we show that researchers
(re-)use available datasets frequently but when they have to create
their own dataset, it is rarely shared with the community (less than
4%). Besides these ﬁndings, a major contribution of this work is a
comprehensive list of available repositories/datasets which may be
employed in research and are summarized on http://datasets.
fbreitinger.de2 (a less comprehensive version of our ﬁndings is
provided in Appendix A). Secondly, we provide an overview of the
top 7 used in Table B.6 (in Appendix B).
Limitations
All of our data analysis was performed by manual inspection.
We note that human error might have been introduced, but we
attempted to alleviate the errors by conducting multiple runs. Due
to time constraints, our dataset of research articles included only
papers from 2010 up to 2015 from selected venues and does not
include every single paper published worldwide in the cyber fo-
rensics domain. We do however believe that our research paper
dataset is representative in both breadth and depth. We argue that
our results are still applicable and our ﬁndings paint the picture of
the state of the domain with regards to datasets.
Related work
Our study was inspired by Abt and Baier (2014) who published
an article named availability of ground-truth in network security
research. In their article, the authors analyzed 106 network security
papers over four years (2009e2013) and concluded with three
main ﬁndings: (1) many researchers manually produced their
datasets, (2) datasets are often not released after the work is
completed and (3) there is a lack of standardized datasets that are
labeled that can be used in research. These weaknesses combined,
produced one of the major disadvantages facing the cybersecurity/
forensics community to this day, which is low reproducibility,
comparability and peer validated research.
Penrose et al. (2013) (as mentioned in the introduction) and
Fitzgerald et al. (2012) also argued that it is poor common practice
to perform research and not publish the underlying dataset.
Another example comes from Axelsson (2010) who stated that it is
“difﬁcult to compare the results we obtain with previous results,
since the data was not available for comparison”. To encourage
comparative research in the ﬁeld, he performed his experiment on
the open Digital Corpora (see next paragraph). Hence, researchers
that want to validate the study can access the dataset. Additional
datasets from their work were also made available upon request. A
proactive approach was taken by Garﬁnkel et al. (2009) who out-
lined the restrictions put on forensic research due to the lack of
freely available, standardized datasets. Consequently, Garﬁnkel
lead the creation of the Digital Corpora (digitalcorpora.org)e one of
the ﬁrst free online dataset repositories for digital forensics. Despite
its popularity, it seems like the platform is no longer updated e at
the time writing, the last post was from September 2014.
Methodology
While this work was inﬂuenced by Abt and Baier (2014), the
difference between both studies is that we do not exclusively focus
on network trafﬁc but on all kinds of datasets that may be useful for
cybersecurity/forensics research, e.g., malware, disk images or
memory dumps. Moreover, our study expands to a broader number
of articles, results from Google searches and provides an overview
of existing datasets. To analyze the availability of datasets which we
deﬁne in Sec. Deﬁnition of a dataset, we ﬁrst investigated peer-
reviewed articles from several conferences/journals and then per-
formed online searches. The details of both steps are discussed in
Sec. Analyzing peer-reviewed articles and Sec. Online searches,
respectively.
Deﬁnition of a dataset
For this work we deﬁne a dataset as a collection of related,
discrete items that has different meanings depending on the sce-
nario and was utilized for some kind of experiment or analysis. For
instance, valid datasets would be but are not limited to ﬁles,
memory dumps, raw images, pcap ﬁles, log ﬁles, outputs from
/dev/urandom that were analyzed/processed. In contrast, here are
some examples that we did not consider as datasets: an input that
was only used to measure runtime efﬁciency, results written to log
ﬁles, or a tool that outputs data which is never used.
Analyzing peer-reviewed articles
The ﬁrst phase entailed the collection and analysis of publica-
tions from digital forensics and security conference proceedings as
well as journal publications3 spanning six years (from 2010 to
2015). The decision for these conferences/journals was based on
our familiarity, experience, access to articles and quality of the
venue (which may be considered subjective). For each article uti-
lizing a dataset, we asked the following questions:
1. Origin of datasets: Is the dataset computer generated (e.g., an
algorithm, bot, /dev/urandom), experiment generated (e.g., a
user creates speciﬁc scenarios) or user generated (e.g., real
world data). Results are discussed in Sec. Origin of datasets.
2. Availability of datasets: Are datasets available to the
community?
 Was the utilized dataset available prior to the research?
(re-usage)
 If the dataset was created, was it released? (availability)
 If the dataset was available prior to the research, is the origin
disclosed/is it freely available? (proprietary to one ‘group’)
Findings are presented in Sec. Availability of datasets.
3. Kinds of datasets: What datasets exist and can be used by
researchers?
 Were any third party databases, services or online tools used
in the creation of datasets?
2 If you want to contribute, please submit your dataset information to the authors
by using the contact form on the website.
3 The following conferences were examined: IEEE Security and Privacy, Digital
Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS e USA, EU), International Conference on Digital
Forensics & Cyber Crime (ICDF2C), and Association of Digital Forensics, Security and
Law (ADFSL). The following journal was looked at: Digital Investigation.
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The results of this question are shown in Sec. Kinds of datasets.
4. What is missing: What datasets or other things are currently
missing? This will be addressed in Sec. What is missing.
Additionally, we collected the following information (when
possible): publication name, author(s), conference/journal, pub-
lished year, dataset description, dataset size, method of gaining
access to the dataset, and the dataset's location (URL).
Online searches
For the second phase, we worked in reverse order and queried
Google for available datasets/repositories that may have not been
used to their full potential in our ﬁeld or appeared in any articles
that we had analyzed. We speciﬁcally used four queries related to
the following: ‘available digital forensics dataset repositories’,
‘available cybersecurity and forensics dataset repositories’, ‘avail-
able malware dataset repositories’, and ‘available computer dataset
repositories’. In our analysis, we focused on the ﬁrst 100 results for
each query. Once a repository/dataset was identiﬁed, we gathered
data similar to ones found referenced in academic articles. Addi-
tionally, we attempted to identify where possible, articles that had
already used such datasets/repository or that had analyzed such
data in some manner. The results are shown in Sec. Datasets found
through Google research.
Results overview and origin
A total of 715 articles were analyzed in this study from confer-
ences and journals listed in Sec. Analyzing peer-reviewed articles
where approximately 49% employed datasets. Our analysis started
with the conference proceedings of IEEE Security & Privacy (S & P)
where 76 out of 240 (z32%) articles utilized datasets. Thus, the
majority of the articles did not involve datasets as they focused on
studies informing the community about standards, techniques,
policies and laws but also about topics on programming, algo-
rithms, cryptography, hardware and system ﬂaws, etc. Given the
fairly small number of articles utilizing datasets in S & P, we sur-
veyed the digital forensics domain where we hypothesized more
datasets would be employed. Our starting point was the Digital
Forensic Research Workshop (US & EU) which yielded 78 out of 91
(~86%) articles that included datasets. Due to the signiﬁcantly
higher adoption of datasets in the digital forensics domain, the
remaining analysis focused on conferences/journals that embodied
digital forensics as a main thematic topic. In summary, we found
the following ratios: (i) International Conference on Digital Foren-
sics & Cyber Crime (ICDF2C) had 60 out of 107 that used datasets;
(ii) Association of Digital Forensics, Security & Law (ADFSL, Con-
ference) contained 29 out of 87 articles that utilized datasets; and
(iii) Digital Investigation (Journal) contained 108 out of 190 articles
that employed datasets.
Origin of datasets
The ﬁrst aspect we analyzed was the origin of the datasets and
how they were created. A summary of our ﬁndings is shown in
Table 1 which will be discussed throughout the upcoming sub-
sections. Note, the ‘mixed sets’ row holds articles we could not mark
with a single category. For instance, Mohamed and Yampolskiy
(2012) developed a new facial recognition approach and their
testswere executed on the ORL dataset (now known as the database
of faces) as well as two sets of avatar images. Given that ‘mixed sets’
represented only a small part of all the utilized datasets, we focused
our analysis on datasets marked with a single category.
Experiment generated datasets
Over half of the datasets found in this study were experiment
generated, where researchers created speciﬁc scenarios to conduct
their experiments. There are several reasons for having such a
heavy shift towards this kind of data. First, in many cases, there is a
lack of real world datasets available to the digital forensics com-
munity (Baggili and Breitinger, 2015). Another reason is that using
experiment generated data allows researchers to test and verify
such data, especially when conducting experiments on new tech-
nologies as that is common within the area of cybersecurity and
digital forensics (Garﬁnkel et al., 2009). For instance, Lee et al.
(2014) investigated the possibility of stealing webpages from the
browser by exploiting vulnerabilities of Graphical Processing Units
(GPUs) where memory dumps from both attackers and victims
were created and collected.
User generated datasets
With over 36%, user generated datasets (a.k.a. real world
datasets) were the second most used type of data. According to
Baggili and Breitinger (2015), experimenting on real world data is
crucial for developing reliable algorithms and tools e “how can we
learn from our past when we do not have real, accessible data to
learn from?” One of the major reasons is clearly copyright and
privacy laws which prohibit sharing with the community (Abt and
Baier, 2014). If real world data was used, we found the following
different origins:
Dataset was released: A prominent example of a real-world
dataset is the Enron e-mail dataset (A.4.6.1)4 which was pos-
ted online by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission after
its investigation and later on purchased by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT). Eventually, the dataset was
stripped of private user information and e-mail attachments to
avoid violating user privacy rights.5 Note, this was one of the
most frequently used sets.
User data was collected before research: Some institutions
(especially Universities) collected real world data upfront, e.g.,
from students where the individual signs an agreement and
then researchers capture the desired information. One example
is Spam Data Mine, a research project under The Center for In-
formation Assurance and Joint Forensics Research (CIS-JFR),
which generates information about currently on-going cam-
paigns by spammers. It archives spam e-mails received from
numerous sources and honeypots, and collects approximately 1
million spam e-mails each day (Khan et al., 2014). Another
example is work by Guido et al. (2016),6 that investigated user
behavior on mobile devices over a three month period. Mobile
devices were handed out to college students after following
Table 1
Overview of the origin of the 351 identiﬁed datasets out of the 715 analyzed articles.
Articles Total
Experiment generated 56.4% 198
User generated 36.7% 129
Computer generated 4.6% 16
Mixed sets (user, experiment & computer) 2.3% 8
4 These references will be found throughout the paper and refer to the overview
tables in Appendix A. Precisely, there is more information at point (A.3.6.1) in the
ref-column.
5 https://www.technologyreview.com/s/515801/the-immortal-life-of-the-enron-
e-mails/.
6 Note, this article was not part of our study but we believe it provides a good
example.
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human review board practices and the mobile phone images
were then collected to be used by researchers at MITRE.
Collaboration with law enforcement: According to our results,
there were at least eight collaborations between law enforce-
ment agencies and academia. One example is Rogers and
Seigfried-Spellar (2014) where law enforcement asked re-
searchers to investigate Internet artifacts from a suspect's
Internet Browsing History/Bookmarks to identity any trends in
pornography use. Liberatore et al. (2010) provided a second
example where they developed a tool named RoundUp for law
enforcement to analyze peer-to-peer (P2P) ﬁle sharing net-
works. “Using leads and evidence from RoundUp, a total of 558
search warrants have been issued and executed during that
time.”
Source of data is online: A signiﬁcant amount of data is also
publicly available online although the intent was never research.
For instance, the Apache Mail Archives (A.4.6.3) is a mail archive
used by Armknecht and Dewald (2015). Other examples are
applications through Google Play, Twitter, YouTube or Google
images where one can access real world data. Within digital
forensics, the Digital Corpora online repository is popular as it
offers disk images purchased from various countries in the
world, ﬁles crawled from the Internet and so on.
One may argue that there are more than the four aforemen-
tioned categories or that a set falls into several classes. For instance,
Drebin (A.4.7.3) is a collection of over 5500 Android malware ap-
plications collected from disparate sources. Thus far, this source
was only used once based our research article analysis, but overall
according to their website, it has been utilized by at least 157
universities and organizations around the world. Other examples
are from the National Institute of Standards & Technology. They
provide massive collections of data across these categories, e.g., the
National Software Reference Library (NSRL, nsrl.nist.gov) which
was leveraged by Rowe (2013) and is a list of over 100 million
hashes of applications; or the National Vulnerability Database nvd.
nist.gov which was utilized by Liu et al. (2014).
Computer generated datasets
The ﬁnal category is computer generated datasets or synthetic
datawhichmay have several origins, e.g., an algorithm, bots, /dev/
urandom or simulators. Our analysis revealed that almost 5% of the
analyzed articles employ those datasets which is not necessarily a
surprise e often researchers in digital forensics want to solve real
world problems and therefore cannot use simulated or generated
data. One argument for generated data is the exact knowledge of
the ground truth. For instance, Breitinger et al. (2014c) utilized
pseudo-random data from SecureRandom.random_bytes to
analyze the precision & recall rates of approximate matching al-
gorithms. Their challenge was that no labeled real world data
existed and therefore the only possibility was generated data. Other
forms of computer generated datasets could be acquired from
websites such as Creative Crash7 and CG Society.8 For instance,
Farid and Bravo (2012) used these types of datasets to measure the
difference between real and computer generated images.
Usage of third party databases, services or online tools
In our research, we realized that about 20.4% (39/191) articles
used third party databases, services or online tools to retrieve in-
formation. For instance, Conti et al. (2010) created fragment data
using random data from the website random.org. The motivation
for the researchers was the high quality of the random data; it is
based on atmospheric noise. Others that employed databases and
services are Al-Shaheri et al. (2013) who queried openMalware.org
to acquire malware for their research and Nappa et al. (2015) who
utilized virusTotal.com to scan for malicious ﬁles.
Availability of datasets
The second part of our study analyzed the availability and re-use
of datasets. A summary of our ﬁndings is depicted in Table 2 and
will be discussed in the following subsections.
Creating vs. re-using datasets
The ﬁrst row in Table 2 provides an overall summary and in-
dicates that 45.6% of the articles analyzed produced their own
datasets in their experiments while 54.4% of the articles utilized
datasets that existed (re-use of an existing set). This almost equal-
share seems reasonable as researchers often train algorithms based
on simulated/experiment data while on the other hand for evalu-
ating performance/comparing two algorithms often real world
datasets are favored, e.g., Laskov et al. (2014) used the Contagio
(A.3.2.1) malware sets tomeasure and compare algorithm accuracy.
Coming to the high usage of self-made datasets, some researches
clearly stated they were required to create their own dataset since
nothing was available. For instance, Roussev and Quates (2013)
created the msx-13 corpus (A.4.8.3) because they could not ﬁnd
an appropriate sample for their experiment. This corpus contains
22,000 MS Ofﬁce 2007 random ﬁles (e.g., docx, xlsx, pptx) crawled
from the Internet. This indicates that researchers re-use datasets if
they are available and do not necessarily favor building their own.
Similar to the introduction and Penrose et al. (2013)’s statement,
Fitzgerald et al. (2012) mentioned that “most of the previous work
on this problem [ﬁle fragment classiﬁcation] exclusively uses pri-
vate datasets, making it more difﬁcult for other researchers to
reproduce experimental results.” Both recommended that all
studies should use the freely available sets from Digital Corpora
(A.4.8.5) in order to encourage friendly competition and aid other
researchers interested in reproducing results.
Currently available datasets
The current availability is discussed in the second row of Table 2
e only 29.0% (102) of all sets are available for research and thus
allow reproducible results. The vast majority (96) of the sets
already existed where on the other hand only 3.8% of the newly
created ones were released. Examining the origin of currently
available sets revealed, that 59.8% (61/102) employed real world
datasets. Subsequently, 38.2% of available datasets were recognized
as experiment generated and 2.0% as computer generated datasets.
Table 2
Results of 715 analyzed articles with 351 containing datasets.
Articles Total
Created through research 45.6% 160/351
e Existed prior to research (re-use) 54.4% 191/351
Currently available sets 29.0% 102/351
e Existed and available (re-use) 50.3% 96/191
e Created and released 3.8% 6/160
Exist and not available 29.3% 56/191
Available as servicesa 20.4% 39/191
a This was discussed in the Sec. Usage of third party databases, services or online
tools.
7 https://www.creativecrash.com/.
8 http://www.forums.cgsociety.org/.
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Most of the user generated datasets originated from four different
major online repositories, ranked in descending order (Digital
Corpora, Enron E-mail Dataset, the t5-corpus (A.4.8.4) and Android
Malware Genome Project (no longer available)). Subsequently, the
majority of experiment generated datasets originated from fourmain
repositories, including the already mentioned Digital Corpora (this
repository contains both kinds).
One example is the M57-patents scenario byWoods et al. (2011)
which offers a variety of experiment generated dataset samples
(e.g., RAM data, e-mails, disk drive images, etc.). This is followed by
The CFReDS Project, BOSS (A.3.3.1), and Digital Forensics Tool
Testing Images (DFTT).9 On the other hand, articles that used
computer generated datasets were the most scarce and generally
relied on random.org or /dev/urandom to create the data. That
being said, we were only able to identify the particular source but
not the dataset itself, e.g., random.org will produce a different
output for every query. Furthermore, only 3.8% of newly created
sets were released for future research where almost all identiﬁed
sets were classiﬁed as experiment generated datasets with the
exception of one, classiﬁed as user generated.
Non available datasets
This section focuses on datasets that exist but were not avail-
able. Speciﬁcally, we discovered 29.3% (56/191) articles with data-
sets that we were unable to verify and classify as currently
available. We organized this set of articles into three groups:
Source is unknown: With a total of about 39.3% (22/56), this is
the most common reason for dataset unavailability. This is a
major problem because not knowing the source of the datasets
may raise questions about the quality and integrity of such data.
Moreover, it completely hinders researchers from reproducing
experimental results. Two examples that did not clearly state
where the data originated from are Boukhtouta et al. (2015) and
Brown (2011). They used speciﬁc services online to acquire
datasets. However, the articles failed to specify if the acquired
data was freely given to them or if a fee was required for such
service. We rated this as unavailable as funds in research
(especially in academia) are limited.
Source has privacy restrictions: The second most common reason
with over 46.4% (26/56) for not releasing the datasets were
privacy concerns as discussed in Sec. User generated datasets. In
other words, these were mostly real world datasets generated
by Universities, Government agencies and law enforcement and
could not be released.
Source not accessible: About 1/7 of the articles had accessibility
problems, such as temporarily unavailable, download link
broken or not maintained anymore. For instance, Zhou and Jiang
(2012) created and maintained a highly utilized free Android
Malware Genome Project10 (according to their website it was
shared with 460 entities). However, the repository is not avail-
able anymore as the students graduated. Note, we expect the
number of ‘source not accessible’ to grow for older articles
(recall in this study we focused on 2010e2015).
Kinds of datasets
This section clusters the identiﬁed datasets together. Therefore,
we created sections for each of the major dataset types we found
and brieﬂy summarize what was found. Since some sources (e.g.,
Digital Corpora) is a collection of datasets, the reference to Digital
Corpora will show up in multiple sections. The subsections contain
datasets that were directly used in research or found to be utilized
within the given sources, e.g., if a source provides sets A, B and C,
but only A was used in an article, we will still name B and C in the
appropriate subsection.
In summary, we found over 70 different datasets though our
article analysis and organized them in 21 categories with major
ones discussed in the following subsections. Each subsection will
provide references/links to the available datasets, and provide a
brief overview, e.g., origin, amount of samples, total size, etc. (when
obtainable). Additionally, we provide our detailed results in
Appendix A; the latest version of the datasets’ table can be found on
the project website.
Malware datasets (computer and mobile)
In total, seven real world data online repositories were found
throughout this study that offer computer and mobile malware
samples (note, there are additional ‘services’ as mentioned in Sec.
Usage of third party databases, services or online tools).
Android. In total, three repositories were frequently used. (1)
Drebin (Arp et al., 2014) is a collection of 5560 Android samples
from 179 differentmalware families collected between 2010 and
2012 and was used by Talha et al. (2015) to test permission
based malware detection. (2) Contagio Mobile Mini-Dump
(A.4.7.1) is part of the larger computer malware repository
Contagio Malware Dump. In contrast to other repositories, this
website is more like a traditional blog with an upload/download
functionality. Thus, users can download the repository but also
extend it. According to the website, there are over 200 malware
posts and each post might contain more than one malware
sample, collected from 2011 to 2016. Lastly, (3) Jang et al. (2015)
possess a dataset (A.4.7.2) of 9990 malware samples which can
be requested for research purposes. Part of this dataset included
samples from the repository Contagio Mobile Mini-Dump and
Virus Share (A.3.2.2) (exact amount not mentioned in article).
Computer malware. In total, four repositories were utilized in the
analyzed articles: (1) Contagio Malware Dump is similar to its
counterparts and has around 400 posts. (2) VX Heaven (A.3.2.3)
which is a virus information website that contains over 271,000
computer malware samples. However, it is unknown how often
thewebsite is updated and as thewebsite states, the last time the
malware collection was scanned was by Kaspersky Anti-Virus in
2006. (3) Virus Share which was the most comprehensive mal-
ware collection that was referenced with over 27 million sam-
ples. Although not stated, it seems that this repository is a mix of
mobile and computer malware. Additionally, it is one of themost
updated sites with new entries every month. Consequently, this
malware site is one of the most secure in relation to the acqui-
sition of malware since access to the site is by invitation only. If
access is needed an e-mail is required to be sent to the admin
stating reasons to be added. Lastly (4), the forum KernelMode.info
(A.3.2.4) was mentioned by Al-Shaheri et al. (2013). According to
the post dates which range from 2010 to 2016, this forum seems
still active but registration is required. Unfortunately, the
amount of malware samples in this forum is unveriﬁable but it
seems to have a mix of mobile and computer malware as well.
E-mail datasets
In total, three e-mail datasets were found. The Enron E-mail
Dataset version 2015 introduced by Schmid et al. (2015) which
9 http://dftt.sourceforge.net/.
10 http://www.malgenomeproject.org.
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consists of over 619,000 real worldmessages belonging to 158 users.
Besides that, Armknecht and Dewald (2015) used about 75,724 real
world e-mails from the Apache online e-mail repository which was
never intended to be a dataset but provides real world examples.
Lastly, we found about 12 e-mails in Digital Corpora's experiment
generated scenarios which however were never utilized.
File sets/collections
File sets are collections of ﬁles with various types like text, html,
pdf, doc, ppt, jpg, xls, gif, zip or csv. They are frequently used for
different purposes (e.g., to test/improve forensic ﬁle formats like
AFF4 (Schatz, 2015)). The most prominent and comprehensive
dataset may be the GovDocs1 corpus from Digital Corpora which
consists of ~1 million documents gathered by crawling the .gov
domain. Given that massive size, a common subset is the t5-corpus
which was created by Roussev (2011) and contains 4457 ﬁles of
various types and is commonly used for testing approximate
matching, e.g., by Breitinger and Roussev (2014). Lastly, Roussev
and Quates (2013) also created the msx-13 corpus which contains
22,000MS Ofﬁce 2007 user generated random ﬁles (e.g., docx, xlsx,
pptx) crawled from the Internet.
RAM dumps
Our study found six repositories having over 90 dumps where
all of them were experiment generated (obviously RAM cannot be
fully controlled and therefore it can be considered as a mixture of
user and experiment data). The ﬁrst set was published byMinnaard
(2014) where the authors acquired their own RAM data from
different operating systems and devices. The authors state the
complete RAM archive is available on request, but a sample with
over 1 GB of data can be downloaded (A.4.9.1). A second set con-
sisting of ﬁve 1 GB RAM dumps (Windows, 2000, 2003, Vista Beta 2,
and XP) is provided by the CFReDS Project (A.4.9.3). According to
the website, the “systems were not engaged in any malicious or
even network based activity at the time of imaging.” Two more
dumps of WinXP 32-bit machines were released by the DFRWS'
forensic challenge (A.4.9.2). Another experiment generated dataset
which was used by Case and Richard (2015) originates from The Art
of Memory Forensics book (Ligh et al., 2014) and can be down-
loaded from the corresponding website (A.4.9.4). This single dump
has a size of 3.8 GB. Lastly and the most comprehensive collection
of memory dumps with 88 samples and a total size of over 44 GB
can be downloaded from Digital Corpora (A.4.9.6).
Images of computer drives
Especially in digital forensics, complete disk images are valuable
to create and test tools as well as procedures. Leading the way is the
Real Data Corpus (RDC) from Digital Corpora which according to
their website11 “is a collection of raw data extracted from data-
carrying devices that were purchased on the secondary market
around the world.” As of 2011, the non-U.S corpus contained 1289
hard drive images ranging in size from 500 MB to 80 GB. According
to Garﬁnkel et al. (2009) there is also a U.S RDC which contains
1228 hard disk images, however, we could not locate it on the
website nor does it say anything about it at the time of writing. A
second but way smaller set is provided by the CFReDS Project
(A.5.15.3) which contains three images extracted with different
imaging tools (Encase, iLook,& Compressed dd). The original image
was made with 5 partitions (OS Extended Journaling, OS Extended,
another OS Extended, OS Standard&UNIX File System) created on a
MAC OS X. According to the website, the purpose of having images
extracted from 3 different tools was to test if those tools would
recognize the ﬁle systems created on the Mac OS X.
Images of other devices
Besides hard-drive images, we found a series of other images
which will be brieﬂy explained in the following:
Cell Phones: In total, we found 26 images within the two re-
positories CFReDS (A.4.11.1) and Digital Corpora (A.4.11.2). The
former one contains 14 images; 7 from a Nexus One and 7 from a
Nexus S-1 while the latter one has 12 images from Black Berry
Torch 9800, HTC One V, iPhone 3GS and the Nokia 6102i.
Gaming systems: Although there are a variety of consoles out
there which get analyzed, we only identiﬁed 2 sets with Xbox
images. The ﬁrst one 3.1.1 was released by Moore et al. (2014)
and according to them it was released so the “forensic com-
munity may expand upon our work”. The second one 3.1.2 came
through the nps-2014 XBox-1 scenario comprising of 4 disks; 2
originals and 2modiﬁed by experiments. No other game console
image was found.
SIM card: SIM card images were not utilized in any article, none-
theless, we discovered at least 3 images in the CFReDS (A.4.14).
Apple iPod & Tablet: Although not utilized in any of the articles,
Digital Corpora offers a total of 10 iPod disk images (A.5.18) and
25 disk images of various tablets (A.5.19) (brands not disclosed).
Flash Drives: As far as real world ﬂash drive images go, Digital
Corpora offers a total of 643 ﬂash images (e.g., USB, Memory
Stick, SD and other), with sizes from 128 MB to 4 GB with real
world data. Furthermore, it offers the nps-2009-canon2 (A.5.16)
and nps-2013-canon1 sets which is a collection of 7 images of
32 MB SD cards which were used by Lambertz et al. (2013) &
Garﬁnkel et al. (2010) for testing image/picture carving tools.
Network trafﬁc
This section summarizes a variety of different network trafﬁc
sources which include PCAP ﬁles acquired through tools such as
Wireshark or logs (i.e., port and protocol data, IP and operating
systems source information and so on). The following datasets
were found through our study: The ﬁrst set was generated for the
DFRWS 2009 forensic challenge (A.4.12.2) and thus contains
experiment generated PCAP ﬁles where most of the trafﬁc is HTTP
trafﬁc on port 80. A second shared PCAP dump (A.4.12.3) was
created by Karpisek et al. (2015). The dataset was compiled by the
researchers for the purpose of acquiring WhatsApp traces that they
were able to decrypt. The dataset is comprised of 3 PCAP ﬁles
containing WhatsApp register and call trafﬁc. A wireless network
repository named CRAWDAD was discovered in our study (A.4.13)
fromwhich datasets of mobility traces of taxi cabs in San Francisco
were acquired. This website also contains hundreds of other types
of wireless network trafﬁc (e.g., TCP traces, Bluetooth, accelerom-
eter, 802.11p packets, etc.) released since 2002.
Scenarios/cases for analysis
We identiﬁed three scenarios or cases for analysis. The ﬁrst one
is the nps-2009-domexusers on Digital Corpora which is a disk
image of two users (domexuser1 and domexuser2) who commu-
nicate with a third user (domexuser3) via IM and e-mail. The disk
image is of a Windows XP SP3 system (NTFS format and used twice
in our study). The second comprehensive scenario is the 2009-
m57-patents created by Woods et al. (2011) for digital forensics11 http://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/disk-images/real-data-corpus.
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and security educational purposes. According to the website, the
“scenario tracks the ﬁrst four weeks of corporate history of theM57
Patents company”. It consists of redacted drive images, USB drive
images, RAM Images, network trafﬁc and documentation. While
this scenario was originally designed for education purposes, it was
also utilized by Garﬁnkel and McCarrin (2015)'s experiment where
it served as sample input to test hash carving techniques. The last
scenario consists of three network log traces plus a USB device
image from the CFReDS Rhino Hunt scenario. Additionally, this
source comes with a answers.pdf which allows to fully understand
the scenario.
Mixed and others
Some sets that could not be classiﬁed are summarized in the
following:
Pictures: Besides ﬁnding a great amount of real pictures, we also
found computer generated graphics and forged images tainted
with steganography. Some of these datasets come fromwebsites
such as ‘Break our Steganography System’ (BOSS, A.3.3.1), which
hosts a challenge that contains a testing database of 1000
512 512 pgm greyscale images and a training database of 9074
cover images.
Language corpus (text): Language corpora are often used for
Statistical Machine Translation. A common collection is the
European Parliament Proceedings Parallel Corpus 1996e2011
(A.3.5.6) which contains about 21 European language versions
and 60 million words per language.
Chat logs: The dataset (A.5.20) is comprised of 1100 chat logs
from 11,143 chat sessions from a single computer and recorded
between 2010 and 2012 using Messenger Plus!.
Password lists: These sets are commonly used for probabilistic
password research such as work by Ma et al. (2014). Some
comprehensive dictionaries are listed on a security wiki page
(A.5.21) and have millions of leaked passwords from websites
such as RockYou, Myspace, and Hotmail. According to this
website, these datasets are useful “to generate or test password
lists”. Note, any type of private information such as name or e-
mail is redacted.
Datasets found through Google research
While the previous sections focused on articles only, this section
summarizes the results from our Google searches (see Sec. Online
searches). Overall, we identiﬁed ten sources providing datasets:
Four of the sources are websites provided links to other online
repositories and six sources pertained to network trafﬁc, text ﬁles,
and machine learning data. Note: only a few of the sources found
were chosen to be discussed in this section, however, the rest of
them can be found in our website.12
Security Repo: secrepo.com is a comprehensive list of samples of
security related data. As stated on the website, “this is my
attempt to keep a somewhat curated list of Security related data
I've found, created, or was pointed to”. This source contains
about 100 links to datasets or third party references. This in-
cludes samples of networking scanning/recon, shell trafﬁc, se-
curity incidents, system logs, ssl certs, malware, and more.
Note, the following three repositories were only found through
this website. Our Google search did not lead us to either of them
which shows how cumbersome ﬁnding repositories can be.
Mid-Atlantic Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (MACCDC):
netresec.com has PCAP ﬁles of three MACCDC competitions
from 2010 to 2012 which comes to a total of 59 PCAP ﬁles where
the 2010 competition was analyzed and summarized by Carlin
et al. (2010). Additionally, this website includes links to other
websites hosting cyber challenges, malware datasets,
networking trafﬁc, etc.
The Cyber Systems and Technology Group of MIT Lincoln Labora-
tory13: According to the website, this is “the ﬁrst standard
corpora for evaluation of computer network intrusion detection
systems” which was collected by MIT Lincoln Laboratory. The
three datasets (from 1998 to 2000) are composed of ﬁle system
dumps, pcap ﬁles, NT event log audit data, outside TCP dump
Data, as well as “the ﬁrst formal, repeatable, and statistically
signiﬁcant evaluations of intrusion detection systems”. The 1999
evaluation dataset was also analyzed by Mahoney and Chan
(2003).
The Black Market Archives14: As its name implies, this data was
acquired from Dark Net Markets (DNM) usually hosted in Tor
hidden networks. The DNMs operate on selling and buying
drugs, guns, and any other type of illegal or government regu-
lated goods. The author of the site claims he collected 1.6 TB of
data comprising 89 DNMs from 2013 to 2015; we found 15 pa-
pers that have cited the website/dataset.
Malware samples15: This personal website lists about 12 links
directed at other malware repositories/services like malshare.
com or thezoo.morirt.com. The former one is an open source
malware repository that permits users to download 1000 sam-
ples per day with a requested public API Key (if more samples
are necessary, it requires to contact the admin). The second
website is a malware repository which aims at collecting all
versions of malware available for download directly from the
site with no restrictions.
PeekaTorrent: peekatorrent.org contains about 3.2 billion hash
values from 2.65 million torrent ﬁles totaling 66 GB of com-
pressed data (84 GB raw) and was collected by Neuner et al.
(2016).
Impact Cyber Trust: Sponsored by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and other technology and cyberse-
curity organizations, this website hosts a central database of
ground truth and synthetic data available for research. The data
provided was donated by at least 10 organizations and ranges
from 2009 to 2016, some of them include, Georgia Tech, Packet
Clearing House, etc. Note, most of the datasets relate to network
trafﬁc (e.g., IDS/Firewall, DNS, IP, BGP routing data, etc.).
What is missing?
Our study shows that many researchers prefer not to share their
datasets which could be for several reasons. Note, the following are
our assumptions and feedback that we received from two authors
that we asked for the reason(s) why the datasets were not released
when the article was published and if they were willing to share
those datasets with the community if asked (A comprehensive
survey study is necessary to verify the feedback we received).
First, researchers may not have the capability of sharing the set
(e.g., the dataset is too comprehensive and one does not have the
online resources available) which could be solved by a centralized,
community based repository (see Sec. Centralized repository). For
instance, some authors said that ‘at the time of publishing, we did
12 http://datasets.fbreitinger.de/.
13 http://www.ll.mit.edu/ideval/data/index.html.
14 http://www.gwern.net/Black-market%20archives.
15 https://zeltser.com/malware-sample-sources/.
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not have a stable platform through which we could provide access
to our data’. Furthermore, they also faced the problem of collecting
data (images in this case), so they agree about the worth of dataset
sharing in research communities. They also would be willing to
share upon request.
A second factor may be related to privacy concerns as discussed
in Sec. Data de-identiﬁcation research. Thirdly, researchers might
simply not have thought of the importance of sharing their data.
This was noted from feedback we received from a researcher we
queried that said ‘initially I did not exactly have in mind how
important it was to curate and share such data’. As far as sharing
this speciﬁc paper's datasets the answer was, ‘I probably wouldn't
want to share them (at least not in a publicly accessible manner)
becausewhen I picked the content off the Internet, I didn't take into
consideration that there might be some privacy or copyright issues
that may come up’. This author also agrees with our thoughts e
making datasets publicly available is deﬁnitely important.
Lastly, we believe that many researchers do not want to share
their datasets for intellectual property reasons. They view the
ownership of the dataset as a way of having something that other
researchers do not have. Besides sharing, we identiﬁed some
additional shortcomings discussed in the following subsections.
Variety
While we found a good amount of sets online, this study also
revealed on what is missing in regards to actual datasets. For
instance, despite published work, we could not ﬁnd samples of
PlayStation Vita and the PlayStation 4 although they have been
used in crimes, e.g., a PlayStation might have been used during the
ISIS Paris attack (Tassi, 2015). A second group of devices we could
not ﬁnd data for were Smart-TVs. Coming to a world where
everything is connected (IoT), there are many more devices we
should try to acquire data from, e.g., Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV), streaming devices, such as Roku or Apple TV.
Updates and upgrades
Having a closer look revealed that there are massive differences
in the number of items per dataset, e.g., while there are 27 million
malware samples, we only found 26 smartphone images. However,
smartphones are frequently used and require extensive research
(e.g., recall the San Bernardino iPhone case.16). A second aspect is
the age of the datasets. While some sets like ﬁles are timeless (to a
certain extend), other require frequent updates and need to be
maintained, e.g., malware or smartphone images. For example, the
2009-domexusers scenario used by Garﬁnkel et al. (2010) includes
disk images of a Windows XP SP3 operating system. On the other
hand, we did not ﬁnd any Windows 10 images. It looks like
whenever a ﬁrst dataset is released, researchers stop releasing new
sets/samples to expand existing corpora. In fact, besides malware
and network trafﬁc which we have found to have the most up to
date datasets out there, no other dataset found was being
completely and continuously updated.
Centralized repository
We believe that the community is missing a single centralized,
maintained and well organized repository. Our study showed that
whenever a repository is created (e.g., Digital Corpora, CFReDS, Virus
Share or Impact Cyber Trust) it is appreciated and frequently used by
researchers. However, often these repositories are not maintained
and become outdated. For instance, the Digital Corporawas updated
the last time in 2014; the Android Malware Genome Project (Zhou
and Jiang, 2012) announced after 3.5 years “due to limited re-
sources and the situation that students involving in this project have
graduated,we decide to stop the efforts ofmalware dataset sharing.”
We see a possible solution in either a government funded endeavor
(as started by the DHS with their impact project) or managed jointly
by the complete community (e.g., a ‘github’ of datasets).
Data de-identiﬁcation research
One of the main problems impeding datasets from being
released is privacy and proprietary concerns. We believe that this
could be addressed by expanding research in the domain of de-
identiﬁcation as pointed out by Garﬁnkel et al. (2009). If we ﬁnd
ways to un-personalize data by removing, changing or manipu-
lating names, phone numbers, addresses, and other personalized
data, datasets could be shared and utilized for research. There are
already guidance methods provided by HIPPA (Ofﬁce of Ethics and
Compliance, 2016) for de-identiﬁcation of data.
Strategies to share complex data
As we are moving more and more into the cloud (Platform as a
Service, Software as a Service), we need strategies on how to share
this kind of data among researchers. In order words, how can we
ensure that results are reproducible by other researchers if it takes
place in a cloud environment. Our study discovered at least 25 ar-
ticles that focused on cloud research. Some articles targeted areas
on how to acquire and analyze data from Apple's iCloud, targeted
ways on how to build trustworthy cloud systems for storing crim-
inal evidence, and methods on how to discover illegal sharing of
copyright materials over the cloud, e.g., Google Drive or DropBox.
Others, for instance, Dykstra and Sherman (2012) or Pichan et al.
(2015) speciﬁcally focused on the forensics aspect and offered op-
tions on how to acquire and share datasets. Nonetheless, none of
the articles mentioned offered any datasets acquired through their
investigations.
Publisher support
Lastly, sharing secondary information (i.e., datasets) is mostly
not well supported by publishers. A step into the right direction
would be to enable sharing data or even force researchers to submit
secondary information. For example, in journals in Elsevier or IEEE,
a dataset may be attached to a paper similar to what third party like
researchgate.net do.
Discussion
Research that requires datasets currently faces several chal-
lenges as data is barley shared among the community. Our results
show that less than 4% shared their dataset while on the other hand
almost 50%make use of existing datasets. In other words, whenever
a repository or a sophisticated dataset is available, researchers
appreciate and utilize it. Beside the lack of sharing datasets,
maintenance and availability are major issues. Many repositories/
datasets are outdated and not maintained. Given that they are
spread throughout the Internet, single individuals might be
responsible formaintainingwhich is simply not feasible. As pointed
out in Sec. Centralized repository, we believe that this could be
solved through a centralized and community based repository, e.g.,
a github for datasets where everyone can share datasets. Another
challenge is the availability of real world data which is of
16 Details about the case can be found at http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/29/apple-
vs-fbi-all-you-need-to-know.html.
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importance for researchers to produce high quality resultseonly
about 1/3 of the datasets originated from real users. In order to
allow reproducibility, improvements and faster research progress,
we believe the mindset of researchers need to change and data
should be released. Besides the aforementioned points, this will
also enable competition and then ultimately lead to better results.
Conclusion & future work
For this article we analyzed 715 research articles and performed
Google searches to summarize the availability of datasets for the
community. While this study comes with a comprehensive list of
available datasets and repositories which can be leveraged by re-
searchers, we also show that there is a lack of sharing data which
we believe is key to improve the quality and pace of research
especially in domains like digital forensics. In the What Is Missing?
section we highlight six points that we believe are needed in order
to solve those current challenges: variety of datasets, updates &
upgrades of repositories/datasets, a centralized repository, more
research in de-identiﬁcation, strategies to share complex data such
as ‘cloud services’ and publisher support. On the other hand, we see
ﬁrst steps towards solutions, e.g., by DHS and their Impact Cyber
Trust project. Our hope is that this article raises the awareness and
importance of sharing information/dataset. For our next steps we
plan on contacting some of the repositories to understandwhy they
stopped maintaining the sites. Additionally, we will try to raise the
awareness of our webportal with the hope that researchers
contribute and keep our list up to date.
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Appendix A. Overview of the datasets
As discussed throughout the article, there are three major
ﬁndings: First, we identiﬁed several datasets by reviewing articles,
second we identiﬁed several sets by running Google searches and a
third we identiﬁed third party services that we found in our arti-
cles' analysis. All of the ﬁndings are presented on our website
http://datasets.fbreitinger.de/ which allows to contribute to the
collection. In addition, we attached Tables A.3eA.5 which contain
the available dataset repositories.
Table A.3
Available datasets.
Dataset type Ref. Source Available datasets Total size Origin Date created/last
modiﬁed
Video Game Console
Disk Images
1.1 University of New Haven cFREG 5 Xbox One partitions 476 GB Experiment Generated 2014
1.2 Digital Corpora 4 disk images 11.9 GB 2013e2014
1.3 DFRWS 2009 Challenge 1 PS3 Linux partition N/A 2009
Computer Malware 2.1 Contagio Malware Dump 11,960 malware samples N/A User Generated 2008e2016
2.2 Virus Share 27,518,833 malware samples 2016
2.3 VX Heaven 271,092 malware samples 2006e2016
2.4 KernelMode.info N/A 2016
Media (Pictures) 3.1 BOSS e Break Our Steganographic
System
10,074 images N/A Experiment Generated 2010
3.2 BOWS2 e Break Our Watermarking
System
10,000 images 1.6 GB 2007e2008
3.3 Columbia University DVMM Laboratory 3600 images N/A User & Computer Generated 2005
3.4 Image Communication Laboratory 2988 images Experiment Generated 2012
3.5 King Saud University e Image Forensics >10 images 2010
3.6 NRCS Photo Gallery e USDA Natural
Resources
Conservation Service
13,483 images User Generated 2016
3.7 The Berkeley Segmentation Dataset and
Benchmark
>300 images 50 MB User & Computer Generated 2003e2013
3.8 AT&T Laboratories Cambridge e The
Database of Faces
400 images 4.5 MB Experiment Generated 1992e1994
3.9 Columbia University e TrustFoto 2218 images N/A Experiment Generated 2004e2006
3.10 The Dresden Image Database >25,137 images 2010
Media (Videos) 4.1 Region-Level Video Forgery 18 video sequences 48 MB Experiment Generated 2013
4.2 YUV Video Sequences 26 video test sequences N/A N/A
4.3 NRCS Photo Gallery e USDA Natural
Resources
Conservation Service
11 videos Computer Generated 2014e2016
4.4 Columbia University e Consumer Video
(CCV) Database
9317 YouTube videos User Generated 2011
World Languages/Text 5.1 Drexel University e Privacy, Security
and Automation Lab
Text ﬁles with 352,500 words N/A User Generated 2009e2012
5.2 Sentiment Word Net 1298 English & Arabic words 2015
5.3 Openwall Wordlists Collection 4 million words with wordlists
for 20þ languages
2012e2015
5.4 Reuters Corpora (RCV1, RCV2, TRC2) e
Reuters Ltd NIST
3,097,370 Reuters news stories 2004e2015
5.5 SCOWL (Spell Checker Oriented Word
Lists)
250,000 English words 2.4 MB 2016
5.6 European Parliament Proceedings
Parallel Corpus
60 million words per language
of 21 European languages
>2 GB 1996e2011
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Appendix B. Top 7 most frequently used datasets
Table B.6 presents the top 7 most used datasets from our study.
The ﬁrst row shows the rank, followed by the name of the actual
dataset. The ‘articles-column’ shows the references organized by
conference.
The ﬁrst eye-catching fact is that sometimes researchers might
need multiple sets, as in the following three cases
 (Garﬁnkel andMcCarrin, 2015) and (Roussev et al., 2013) utilized
the govdocs as well as the M57-patents scenario in their studies.
 (Breitinger et al., 2014b) utilized the govdocs as well as the t5 ﬁle
corpus (note, t5 is a subset of govdocs).
This example clearly demonstrates how convenient it is to have
a centralized dataset repository, which at the same time could
beneﬁt research in more than one form.
Another interesting observation from the table is the fact that
some of these datasets were reused more than once by the same
authors in different occasions. For instance, the t5 File Corpus was
referenced from seven articles, however, there are only four
different names: Breitinger, Roussev, Gupta and Baggili which
had several collaborations. Other examples are Beebe & Liu and
the M57-patents scenario or Lu et at./Quach and the pictures/
BOSS set.
Table A.4
Available datasets.
Dataset type Ref. Source Available datasets Total size Origin Date created/last
modiﬁed
Email Datasets 6.1 Enron Email Dataset 619,446 messages
from 158 users
>423 MB User Generated 2015
6.2 Digital Corpora 12 Emails 34.8 KB Experiment Generated 2012
6.3 Apache Mail Archives N/A N/A User Generated 2006e2016
6.4 DFRWS 2009 Rodeo Outlook PST ﬁle Experiment Generated 2009
Mobile Malware for Android 7.1 Contagio Mobile >237 malware samples N/A User Generated 2011e2016
7.2 University of Korea Hacking and
Countermeasure Research
Lab e Andro-AutoPsy
9990 malware samples 2013e2014
7.3 University of G€ottingen,
Germany e The Drebin Dataset
5560 malware samples 2010e2012
Different Types of
Computer Files
8.1 DFRWS 2006 Challenge Various types of ﬁles 48 MB Experiment Generated 2006
8.2 DFRWS 2007 Challenge Various types of ﬁles 330 MB 2007
8.3 The MSX-13 Corpus 22,000 MS Ofﬁce 2007 ﬁles 24 GB User Generated 2013
8.4 The t5 Corpus 4457 different types of ﬁles 1.9 GB 2011
8.5 Govdocs1 e Digital Corpora 1 million ﬁles N/A 2009
Ram Dumps 9.1 Article eWicher Minnaard Note: memory sample is
directly linked to a tar ﬁle
>1 GB User Generated 2014
9.2 DFRWS 2008 Rodeo Laptop memory image N/A Experiment Generated 2008
9.3 The CFReDS Project e NIST 5 memory images >2 GB 2005e2007
9.4 The Art of Memory Forensics N/A 4 GB 2014
9.5 Digital Corpora 88 44.1 GB 2014
9.6 DFRWS 2009 Challenge 1 PS3 Linux physical
memory dump
N/A 2009
Apk Files 10.1 Secure-Software-Engineering/DroidBench 119 APK ﬁles N/A User Generated 2015
10.2 Digital Corpora 2128 APK ﬁles 2012
Smartphone Disk Images 11.1 The CFReDS Project e NIST 12 mobile images N/A Experiment Generated 2016
11.2 Digital Corpora 14 mobile images 2011
11.3 DFRWS 2009 Rodeo 1 mobile image 59 MB 2009
Network Trafﬁc (Logs/pcap) 12.1 Digital Corpora 50 pcap ﬁles N/A Experiment Generated 2008e2016
12.2 DFRWS 2009 Challenge 3 pcap ﬁles 2009
12.3 University of New Haven cFREG 1 pcap ﬁle 876 KB 2015
12.4 The CFReDS Project e NIST 3 trace logs 3.8 MB 2016
Wireless Network Traces 13 Crawdad e Resource for Archiving
Wireless Data At Dartmouth
133 datasets N/A User Generated 2012e2016
Subscriber Identity
Module e SIM Card Images
14 The CFReDS Project e NIST 3 SIM images 130 KB Experiment Generated 2016
Table A.5
Available datasets.
Dataset type Ref. Source Available datasets Total size Origin Date created/last modiﬁed
Hard Disk Images 15.1 Digital Corpora 169 disk images 1.106 TB User/Experiment Generated 2008e2015
15.2 Computer Forensic Tool
Testing (CFTT) e NIST
11 dism images 150 MB Experiment Generated 2003
15.3 The CFReDS Project e NIST 53 disk images 12.2 GB 2016
Secure Digital Card e SD Images 16 Digital Corpora 7 SD images 174 MB Experiment Generated 2015
Universal Serial Bus e USB Flash
Drive Images
17.1 Digital Corpora 20 USB images 10.9 GB Experiment Generated 2009e2015
17.2 Computer Forensic Tool
Testing (CFTT) e NIST
1 USB image 124 MB 2005
17.3 The CFReDS Project e NIST 3 USB images 462 MB 2016
17.4 DFRWS 2008 Rodeo 1 USB image N/A 2008
17.5 DFRWS 2009 Challenge 1 USB image 2009
Apple iPod Disk Images 18 Digital Corpora 10 iPod images 55 GB Experiment Generated 2010e2015
Tablet Images 19 Digital Corpora 25 images 16.7 GB Experiment Generated 2012e2014
Chat Logs 20 Article e Tarique Anwar &
Muhammad Abulaish
1100 chat logs 715 MB User Generated 2010e2012
Leaked Passwords 21 Skull Security Wiki 30 sets N/A User Generated 2009e2010
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